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Abstract 
The retail gasoline market is going through a process of restructuring and consolidation in many developed 
economies. During the past decade, a large number of gasoline stations have been closed down. The present paper 
aims to investigate this process. One of the key characteristics of the retail gasoline market is that competition is 
localised, and this spatial dimension of competition has to be taken into account when investigating the (binary) 
decision of whether or not to exit from this business. The results of a probit model estimated on the Austrian retail 
gasoline sector suggest that the degree of spatial differentiation (distance between gasoline stations) as well as 
other station-specific and regional characteristics can explain parts of the actual exit behaviour observed between 
2003 and 2011. 
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1. Introduction 
Economists have long recognised a central tradeoff in 
spatial location choice: stealing customers by locating 
closer to competitors comes at the cost of intensified 
price competition (Marshall, 1920). While a large 
volume of theoretical research analyses strategic 
location decisions, only very few empirical studies 
explicitly consider the spatial dimension when inves-
tigating firms’ entry and/or exit decisions (recent 
examples include Seim, 2006 and Watson, 2005). The 
present paper uses a unique panel data set of retail 
gasoline stations in Austria for the period from 2003 
to 2011 to investigate firms’ exit decisions economet-
rically. The geographical location of each gasoline 
station is linked to information on the Austrian road 
system, which allows us to take into account the 
spatial dimension of competition (distance between 
gasoline stations). 
Investigating exits in a spatial context in the retail 
gasoline market is particularly interesting since 
competition is highly localised in this market. Outlets 
compete with close rivals only; this corresponds nicely 
to theoretical models of spatial competition in indus-
trial organisations. Further, market structure is charac-
terised by a few large companies or retail chains, so-
called majors, dominating the market and operating 
outlets in most local markets. These majors compete 
with a large number of small firms (independent or 
unbranded stations) that are only active in a few or 
even in one local market only. Finally, gasoline is 
a homogeneous product with respect to its chemical 
properties and stations differentiate location as well as 
by providing additional services (shops, opening 
hours, attendant service etc.), which is explicitly taken 
into account in the empirical analysis. 
The Austrian retail gasoline market has experi-
enced considerable structural changes. According to 
the annual reports of the Austrian Economic Chamber, 
the number of gasoline stations decreased from 4,061 
in 1988 to 2,575 stations at the end of 2011. This 
corresponds to a decline of almost 37%.1 Between 
2003 and 2011, 10.9% of stations were shut down and 
29.6% either left the market or changed the brand. The 
                                                 
1 Similar changes have been observed for the US and 
Canadian gasoline markets (Eckert and West, 2005). 
aim of this paper is to shed light on structural changes 
in the Austrian retail gasoline market. In particular, we 
investigate the competition structure and the charac-
teristics of stations with respect to the exit probability. 
Note that individual exit decisions are binary in nature 
(exit yes or no). To investigate discrete exit choices, 
we apply a probit model on station-level data for the 
Austrian gasoline market. The rest of the paper is 
organised as follows: in section 2, we describe the 
data, section 3 reports the empirical results and section 
4 concludes. 
2. Data 
The empirical analysis utilises three different data 
sources. The first contains information on the location 
as well as additional characteristics of all gasoline 
stations in Austria in 2003 collected by Experian 
Catalist. The second data set contains the same infor-
mation for all active stations in 2011. This information 
is obtained from Petrolview, a split-off company from 
Catalist.2 By merging the two data sets, we are able to 
identify the structural changes (exits of gasoline 
stations) between 2003 and 2011. 
We categorise stations into four groups: still ac-
tive, changed brand, shut down and new station. If 
a station is active both in 2003 and in 2011 in the 
same location and under the same brand, it is catego-
rised as still active. The category changed brand 
represents stations that operate in the same location 
but that changed their brand between 2003 and 2011. 
If a gasoline station no longer operated in 2011, it is 
classified in the third category, shut down. Stations 
that are only present in 2011 but did not exist in 2003 
represent market entries and thus were classified as 
new stations. For the purpose of analysing the proba-
bility of exit for one station, we defined the binary 
dependent variable as follows: 
݁ݔ݅ݐ ൌ
൜1,	if	category	changed	brand'	or	shut	down0,	if	category	is	still	active	.																															 (1) 
The third data set contains information on the pop-
ulation and size of the municipalities and districts in 
                                                 
2 See www.catalist.com and www.petrolview.com for 
company details. 
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this region, as a part of the population census collected 
by the Austrian statistical office in 2001. 
Table 1 reports some initial descriptive evidence 
on the dependent variable (exits of gasoline stations) 
by differentiating between branded and unbranded 
stations. A gasoline station is classified as Branded if 
this station belongs to one of ten major brands in the 
Austrian retail gasoline industry and as Unbranded 
otherwise. Of all 837 station exits between 2003 and 
2011, the majority (73.72%) are by branded stations. 
However, the table suggests that the share of exiting 
stations seems to be larger for unbranded stations 
compared with branded stations. Whereas 33.64% of 
all unbranded stations exited, only 28.45% of all 
branded stations left the market. In the econometric 
model, we test whether there is an asymmetry in the 
exit probability of branded and unbranded stations and 
if the presence of an unbranded station affects the exit 
probability of branded stations, as suggested by Eckert 
and West (2005). 
Table 1 The number of station exits between 2003 and 2011 
by type of station 
 Unbranded Branded Total 
Exits 220 617 837 
Percentage of all 
Exits  26.28% 73.72% 100% 
Percentage in 
station category 33.64% 28.45%  
Remarks: The total number of stations is 2822, with 2,169 
(654) stations classified as branded (unbranded). 
Table 2 reports the descriptive statistics for all the 
metric and dummy variables included in the empirical 
model. The variable Samebrand indicates how many 
of the ten nearest neighbours of one station operate 
under the same brand. Following Götz and Gugler 
(2006), we expect a positive effect of this variable on 
the exit probability since a higher market concentra-
tion is argued to lead to more exits. No. of Independ-
ents measures how many of the ten nearest neighbours 
are independent stations. Assuming that independent 
competitors set prices more aggressively suggests 
a positive impact of this variable on exit probabilities. 
Average Distance represents the average distance to 
the ten nearest neighbours. We expect this variable to 
lower the exit probability as a greater distance to 
neighbours reduces the intensity of competition. The 
variable Dealer Owned equals one if a station is 
operated by a dealer and zero otherwise. 
The probability of exiting the market might also be 
related to the characteristics of the individual gasoline 
station. The variable shop indicates if the station has 
a convenience shop. The dummy variable 24h equals 
one if the station is operated non-stop and zero other-
wise. Further, we include a group of dummy variables 
(Speed: < 40 km/h, Speed: 40–60 km/h, Speed: 61–80 
km/h, Speed: 80–100 km/h, Speed: >100 km/h), which 
indicate the speed limit of the street were the station is 
located. The category Speed: >100 km/h represents 
stations that are located on highways and serve as the 
reference category. Attendant Service is also a binary 
explanatory variable containing information on 
whether the station offers an attendant service or not. 
The variables Size ≤ 800 m2, Size: 800–2000 m2 and 
Size > 2000 m2 are dummy variables that measure the 
ground surface of the location. Again, Size > 2000 m2 
as the reference category is excluded from the estima-
tion. 
In addition to these station characteristics, we also 
consider proxy variables for regional differences in 
demand: Commuters represents the ratio of incoming 
plus outgoing commuters to the population at the 
municipality level and Popdens measures the popula-
tion density of the municipality level in 1000 inhabit-
ants per km2. For both variables, we expect to find 
a negative impact on the probability of exit. 
3. Empirical Model and Estimation Results 
Let  , , ,, ,i t i i t i tz c m  denote the profits earned by 
station i at time t with t ∈ ሺ1,∞ሻ. These profits are 
a function of station-specific characteristics (zi), the 
degree of competition in the local market of station i 
(ci,t) as well as other local market characteristics (mi,t) 
that are exogenous to the individual station. An exit 
takes place when stations realise that the expected 
discounted present value of remaining in the market 





i t i i t i t
i tt





      is less than the 
sell-off value (  , , ,, ,i t i i t i ts z c m ), where r is the market-
determined, risk-adjusted discount rate and ][E is the 
expectation operator. The sell-off value is influenced 
by station-specific as well as local market characteris-
tics. The exit rule thus is based on a comparison 
between the sell-off value (  , , ,, ,i t i i t i ts z c m ) and the 
optimal expected discounted profit  .iE   If the first 
term is greater than the second  ,i is E   the firm 
goes out of the market and we observe 1,iexit   
otherwise, it remains and we observe 0.iexit   
The difference between the sell-off value and ex-
pected discounted sum of profits for each station can 
be defined as a continuous variable 
* [ ] ,i i i iexit s E     x   which we assume to be 
a linear function of k explanatory variables x. This 
vector includes station-specific characteristics (zi), 
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measures of the degree of competition (ci) as well as 
local market characteristics (mi). β is a vector of 
dimension ݇ ∙ 1 of parameters that are to be estimated 
and i  is an error term that is distributed normally 
with zero mean and a variance (normalized to unity). 
Note that *iexit  is unobservable. We observe the actual 











The distributional assumptions for the error term 
allow us to state the probabilities of the event as 
   Pr 1 ,iexit   x x   where ( )   denotes the 
cumulative distribution function of a standard normal 
variate (see Wooldridge, 2003 for a detailed descrip-
tion of the probit model). 
Owing to the non-linearity in the normal probabil-
ity distribution, the parameter estimates  do not have 
the same interpretation of marginal effects as in 
standard linear models. The change in the dependent 
variable exiti due to changes in the explanatory varia-
ble xi (marginal effect) is 





Table 2 Definition and descriptive statistics of all variables 
Symbol Definition Mean  (Std. Dev.) Minimum Maximum 
Competition and 
Spatial Variables 
    
Samebrand Number of neighbours with the same brand within the ten nearest neighbours 
0.093 
(0.291) 0 1 
No. of Independents Number of stations within the ten nearest neighbours that are independent stations 
2.053 
(1.584) 0 9 
Average Distance Average distance to the ten nearest neighbours measured in driving time in minutes 
6.936 
(4.766) 0.722 43.204 
Branded Dummy variable set equal to one if the station belongs to one of the ten major brands  0.768 0 1 
Dealer Owned Dummy variable set equal to one if the location is owned by a dealer 0.341 0 1 
Location-specific 
Variables 
    
Shop Dummy variable set equal to one if the location has a conven-ience store 0.764 0 1 
24h  Dummy variable set equal to one if the location is operated non-stop 0.189 0 1 
Speed: < 40 km/h Dummy variable set equal to one if the speed limit on the main road next to the location is less than 40 km/h 0.064 0 1 
Speed: 40–60 km/h Dummy variable set equal to one if the speed limit on the main road next to the location is between 40 and 60 km/h 0.727 0 1 
Speed: 61–80 km/h Dummy variable set equal to one if the speed limit on the main road next to the location is between 61 and 80 km/h 0.139 0 1 
Speed: 80–100 km/h Dummy variable set equal to one if the speed limit on the main road next to the location is between 81 and 100 km/h 0.022 0 1 
Speed: >100 km/h 
Dummy variable set equal to one if the speed limit on the main 
road next to the location is greater than 100 km/h; Highway 
stations (baseline category) 
0.091 0 1 
Attendant Service Dummy variable set equal to one if the location has an attendant service 0.271 0 1 
Size ≤ 800 m2 Dummy variable set equal to one if the ground surface of the location is smaller than 800 m2 0.334 0 1 
Size: 800–2000 m2 Dummy variable set equal to one if the ground surface of the location is between 800 and 2000 m2 0.374 0 1 
Size > 2000 m2 Dummy variable set equal to one if the ground surface of the location is greater than 2000 m2 (baseline category) 0.266 0 1 
Demand Indicators:     
Popdens Population density of the municipality level in 1000 inhabitants per km2 
1.011 
(2.601) 0.001 25.589 
Commuters Ratio of incoming plus outgoing commuters to the population at the municipality level 
0.527 
(0.105) 0.177 0.828 
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where  are parameter estimates and ߶ሺ∙ሻ is the 
density of the standard normal distribution. The 
estimated coefficients, standard errors and marginal 
effects for the probit model are reported in Table 3. 
The estimation model is statistically significant at 
the 1% level as measured by the likelihood ratio test. 
The model correctly classifies 72.86% of all observa-
tions. Note that 29.66% of all stations actually exited 
the market. A naive model predicting exit = 0 would 
also correctly classify 70.43% of all gasoline stations. 
The empirical model reported in Table 3 thus reduces 
classification errors from 29.66% to 27.32%, which 
represents a reduction in the error rate of around 8%. 
The estimation model suggests that exits are more 
likely for gasoline stations in markets with a low 
degree of spatial differentiation. Specifically, the 
probability of exit decreases by 0.5 percentage points 
as the average distance to the ten nearest neighbours 
Table 3 Probit model for the exit decisions of gasoline stations between 2003 and 2011 
Dependent Variable: EXIT #OF OBS. 2822 
 Coefficient Std. Err. Marginal Effect 
Constant –1.193 0.348**  
Competition and Spatial Variables:    
Samebrand 0.500 0.148*** –0.187 
No. of Independents 0.013 0.018 0.004 
Average Distance –0.014 0.006** –0.005 
Unbranded –0.180 0.116 –0.060 
Dealer Owned –0.098 0.066 0.033 
Location Specific Variables:    
Shop –0.197 0.110* 0.070 
24h open –0.321 0.079*** –0.104 
Speed: < 40 km/h 0.782 0.300*** 0.299 
Speed: 40–60 km/h 0.747 0.286*** 0.229 
Speed: 61–80 km/h 0.749 0.325*** 0.282 
Speed:80–100 km/h 0.894 0.123*** 0.343 
Attendant Service 0.166 0.067** 0.058 
Size ≤ 800 m2 0.432 0.082*** 0.153 
Size: 800–2000 m2 0.334 0.071*** 0.117 
Demand Indicators:    
Popdens –0.040 0.012*** –0.013 
Commuters –0.218 0.263 –0.075 
LL() [LL(0)] –1558.991 [1715.647]  
LRT 313.31   
Peudo R2 0.09   
Correctly Classified 72.86%   
False rate for classified as no exit 27.57%   
Classification  Observed 
Exit No Exit Total 
Predicted Exit 88 17 105 
No Exit 749 1968 2717 
Total 837 1985 2822 
Notes: Dummy variables for observations missing from the explanatory variables included. The parameter estimates are 
significantly different from zero at the *** 1%, ** 5% and *, 10% levels. LL() and LL(0) are the log likelihood and restricted 
log likelihood functions, respectively, and LRT refers to the likelihood ratio test. The pseudo-R2 is computed as 
 
 2 .1 0
LLR
LL
    
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increases by one minute. The parameter estimate for 
Average Distance is significantly different from zero 
at the 5% level. This result is consistent with empirical 
studies of price setting in the gasoline market: a high 
density of gasoline stations is found to intensify 
competition and reduce prices (Pennerstorfer and 
Weiss, 2013). Moreover, we find that the number of 
neighbours selling gasoline under the same brand 
influences exit rates. As expected, our estimation 
results suggest that an additional neighbour with the 
same brand within the local market increases the exit 
probability of a station by 18.7 percentage points. This 
effect is significantly different from zero at the 1% 
level. This finding supports Götz and Gugler (2006) 
who analyse the incentive of larger retail chains to 
close outlets as a consequence of a merger. The 
authors actually find that higher market concentration 
reduces product variety (as measured by the number 
of stations per square kilometre). In contrast to Eckert 
and West (2005), we do not observe a significant 
relationship between the number of independent 
stations within the ten nearest neighbours and the exit 
probability of retail gasoline stations. Eckert and West 
(2005) find that a greater local presence of independ-
ents increases the exit probability of major brand 
stations. Moreover, they conclude that this finding is 
consistent with the independent’s hypothesis of ra-
tionalisation. Under the independent’s hypothesis, 
firms unilaterally reduce their station number and 
improve their remaining stations in response to the 
presence of aggressive, low-cost independent stations. 
However, our results suggest, compared with the 
Canadian gasoline market, that the presence of inde-
pendent stations in the Austrian gasoline market does 
not increase competition intensity that much. An 
explanation for this finding could be that the Austrian 
market is not that competitive in comparison to the 
Canadian gasoline market, meaning that independent 
stations do not act that aggressively. Further, our 
results provide no evidence for a difference between 
the exit probability of unbranded and branded stations 
or between dealer-owned and company-owned sta-
tions. 
The results reported in Table 3 suggest a tendency 
towards fewer full service stations (and more self-
service stations) as well as more stations with shops. 
Similar to Carranza et al. (2012), who examine the 
effect of a price floor in Quebec on station shutdown, 
our results also suggest that the presence of an at-
tendant service has a significant positive effect on the 
probability of exit. We find that stations that also 
feature shops have a 7 percentage points lower proba-
bility of exiting compared with stations without 
a shop. The estimation model includes four dummy 
variables characterising the location of the gasoline 
station on different types of streets (stations located on 
a highway are the reference category). We find that 
the probability of the exit of stations located on 
a highway is significantly lower compared with 
stations located on all other types of streets. Further-
more, smaller stations are more likely to exit the 
market than larger ones. Consistent with our expecta-
tions, we observe a significant and negative parameter 
estimate for population density. However, the ratio of 
commuters does not contribute to the explanatory 
power of our model. 
4. Conclusion and Extensions 
The present paper examines the exit decisions of retail 
gasoline stations in Austria over the period 2003 to 
2011. One of the key characteristics of this market is 
that competition is localised; only neighbouring 
stations directly compete for the same customers. This 
spatial dimension of competition has to be taken into 
account when investigating the (binary) decision of 
whether or not to exit from this business. The results 
of a probit model estimated on the Austrian retail 
gasoline sector suggest that the degree of spatial 
differentiation (distance between gasoline stations) as 
well as other station-specific and regional characteris-
tics can explain parts of the actual exit behaviour 
observed during this time period. Our results further 
suggest a tendency towards fewer full service stations 
(and more self-service stations) as well as more 
stations with shops. 
However, note that the present analysis focuses on 
one dimension of the process of restructuring and 
consolidation in the gasoline sector only: exits of 
individual stations. Other dimensions, such as the 
entry of new stations or a merger (and rebranding) of 
existing stations, are ignored. An interesting extension 
of the present analysis thus would be to model the 
different dimensions of structural change in the retail 
gasoline market simultaneously. Secondly, it is plau-
sible to expect some interrelationship between the exit 
decisions of (neighbouring) stations. If, for example, 
two stations compete in a local market, the decision of 
one station to exit might have a positive effect on its 
rival’s probability of survival and vice versa. This 
finding implies that not only do the characteristics of 
a particular station influence its probability of survival 
but so do the characteristics of its neighbours. We 
hope that future empirical research along these lines 
might improve our knowledge of firms’ entry and exit 
behaviour in spatially differentiated markets and thus 
contribute to our understanding of the determinants of 
local market power. 
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